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HE economic downturn that began during the closing months of
the Survey period obviously places both taxpayers and taxing au-
thorities under intense pressure to protect and increase revenue
and will likely result in additional tax contests as both take more aggres-
sive positions, particularly regarding uncertain and new areas of the law.
In that context, it is especially noteworthy that the Survey period wit-
nessed the first ever combined-group Texas franchise tax reports, multi-
ple proposed and amended comptroller regulations, administrative
decisions, and numerous property tax cases. This Survey highlights some
of those cases and developments, illustrating a broad range of interesting
2008 Texas tax issues.
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Houston Wire & Cable Co. v. Combs addressed both the manufacturing
and resale exemptions. Houston Wire & Cable (HWC) contended that
the cable reels used to ship cable to customers qualified for the sale-for-
resale exemption, and that HWC qualified for the manufacturing exemp-
tion.1 HWC argued that the reels possessed additional characteristics,
distinguishing them as a matter of law from the packaging materials that
are excluded from the sale-for-resale exemption in Texas Tax Code sec-
tion 151.302, and that those additional features distinguished the reels
from mere packaging for wire or cable, resulting in a single wire or cable
assembly.2 The court, however, found that the reels were merely packag-
ing materials-that HWC's wire and cable was entirely unusable unless
and until it was separated from its reel, unlike the lipstick tube and ciga-
rette lighter examples presented to the court-and that the reels, based
on the facts presented, did not qualify for the resale exemption. 3
The court also denied HWC's manufacturing exemption argument,
concluding that none of HWC's operations involved changing the intrin-
sic characteristics of the cable; therefore, the operations were not
processing. 4 Likewise, the court concluded that adding the reels to the
cable was merely repackaging and did nothing to make the cable itself
work in a new or different manner and that no fabrication was involved. 5
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of
HWC's refund claim for cable reels, finding that there was legally suffi-
cient evidence to support the district court's finding that HWC was not a
manufacturer and that the reels did not qualify for the sale-for-resale
exemption.6
The transition from having administrative hearings before the comp-
troller's administrative law judges to before the State Office of Adminis-
trative Hearing (SOAH) resulted in a smaller number of sales tax hearing
decisions than usual. Several administrative hearings focused on the
manufacturing exemption, although most of them offered little additional
insight into the comptroller's position on manufacturing issues. Other
hearings considered the scope of taxable services, a topic that the district
court may address in 2009. The comptroller continued to use Tax Policy
News and other informal online communication methods to address is-
sues and procedures, so taxpayers may find it helpful-at least in deter-
1. No. 03-07-00006-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1820, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar.
12, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 61 SMU
L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2008).
2. Houston Wire, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1820, at *7, *9.
3. Id. at *12.
4. Id. at *12-20.
5. Id. at *14.
6. Id. at *19-20.
[Vol. 621462
mining the comptroller's position-to check those sources as well.7
B. COMPTROLLER RULES
Although rulemaking focused on the newly amended and adopted
franchise tax rules, 8 the comptroller also revised several sales and use tax
rules during the Survey period, 9 including Rule 3.291 regarding contrac-
tors.10 As a follow up to the comptroller's earlier focus on concrete-con-
tractor issues, she amended the rule to allow ready-mix concrete
contractors to issue a resale certificate in lieu of paying sales tax on taxa-
ble items incorporated into the concrete. She further amended the rule
to comply with new legislation, which requires contractors who both man-
ufacture concrete for construction purposes and incorporate that con-
crete into realty, to separately state the price of the concrete from any
other charges associated with the contract." The ready-mix concrete
contractor is also required to collect and remit the tax due on the higher
of the invoice price or fair market value, and the amendments more
clearly explain local tax reporting requirements for contractors who im-
prove real property of nonexempt customers.1 2
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. REPORTED CASES AND HEARINGS
Meadwestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue, a U.S. Supreme
Court case, bears mention because of its possible impact on Texas' inter-
pretation of "unitary" in the context of the state's recent enactment of a
combined reporting requirement. 13 The Court decisively and unani-
mously blocked an attempt by the State of Illinois to expand the concept
of unitary taxation beyond the existing boundaries of what constitutes a
7. See, e.g., State Tax Automated Research System, http://cpastar2.cpa.state.tx.us/in-
dex.html (last visited May 30, 2009); Tax Policy News, http://www.window.state.tx.us/tax
info/taxpnw/index.html (last visited May 30, 2009).
8. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
9. See 32 Tex. Reg. 6756, adopted 32 Tex. Reg. 8521 (2007) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286) (requiring wholesalers and distributors of
beer, wine, and malt liquor to file electronically with the comptroller a monthly report of
sales to retailers in Texas); 32 Tex. Reg. 6760, adopted 32 Tex. Reg. 8521 (2007) (to be
codified as an amendment to 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.337) (clarifying that mandatory
gratuity charges when in excess of twenty percent are subject to sales tax in total regardless
of how they are disbursed); 33 Tex. Reg. 6060, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 8398 (2008) (to be
codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.365) (regarding the expansion of
the exemption from sales tax for a three-day period in August concerning sales of clothing
and footwear to include backpacks purchased for use by public elementary or secondary
school students and providing that a retailer who sells more than ten school backpacks to a
customer at the same time must obtain an exemption certificate from the customer verify-
ing that the backpacks are being purchased for use by elementary or secondary school
students).
10. 32 Tex. Reg. 9573 (2007), adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 4186 (2008) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 128 S. Ct. 1498 (2008).
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unitary business, notwithstanding the urging of the respondent, Illinois
Department of Revenue, and the twenty-four states (plus Puerto Rico)
that filed an amicus brief.14 Given the current movement among various
states (including Texas) to enact combined reporting as a basis for state
corporate taxation and to tie that taxation to unitary concepts, the
Meadwestvaco case would appear to have a limiting effect on the reach of
those statutes. The unanimity of the decision would also suggest the
Court's more general lack of receptivity to creative expansion of the
states' taxing jurisdiction over multistate business.
In this case, Mead Corporation (Mead), the parent, was an Ohio corpo-
ration headquartered and "commercially domiciled" in Ohio that had
been in the paper, packaging, and stationery business for many years. 15
In 1968, Mead acquired a corporation in the printing and information
retrieval business, which over the course of time developed the well
known electronic research service known as Lexis. 1 6 In 1994, the tax year
in question, Mead sold the Lexis business to a third party, realizing over
one billion dollars in capital gain.17 The Lexis subsidiary corporation had
operated in Illinois and paid significant tax to Illinois over the years on its
ongoing operations.18 Mead had also paid substantial Illinois corporate
tax on its own separate and distinct paper business. Mead did not, how-
ever, pay Illinois tax on its capital gain on the sale of the Lexis business.
Illinois assessed Mead additional tax and penalties of approximately four
million dollars on the gain.19 The resulting litigation focused on whether
Mead should be obligated to pay the Illinois tax on the sale of the Lexis
business on the ground that the Lexis business and Mead's paper business
were unitary in nature.20 The Court held that the state courts erred in
considering whether the business division served an "operational pur-
14. Id. at 1509. Under a unitary taxation method, if at least one member of the corpo-
rate group is directly subject to a state's taxing jurisdiction and the group is deemed uni-
tary, then the entire income of the corporate group becomes part of the tax base in that
state, to the extent reasonably apportioned to that state under a proper formula. The key
determinant is whether the business entities at issue carry on a "unitary business." Id. at
1502. As the court stated, the "hallmarks" of a unitary relationship are functional integra-
tion, centralized management, and economies of scale where the related corporations con-
duct distinct businesses. Id. at 1509. See also the Texas definition of unitary: "[A] single
economic enterprise that is made up of separate parts of a single entity or of a commonly
controlled group of entities that are sufficiently interdependent, integrated, and interre-
lated through their activities so as to provide a synergy and mutual benefit that produces a
sharing or exchange of value among them and a significant flow of value to the separate
parts." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0001(17) (Vernon 2008).
15. MeadWestvaco, 128 S. Ct. at 1502.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1504.
19. Id. at 1503.
20. Id. at 1504. The facts revealed that the Mead business and the Lexis business were
almost entirely separate and separately conducted. "Neither business was required to
purchase goods or services from the other and neither received any discount on the rela-
tively insignificant goods or services purchased from the other and neither was a significant
customer of the other." Id. Over the period of Mead's ownership of Lexis, Lexis existed as
a wholly owned subsidiary corporation for certain periods of time and as an unincorpo-
rated division of Mead for other periods of time, including 1994, the year in question.
[Vol. 621464
pose" in Mead's paper business after determining that Mead and Lexis
were not unitary, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 21
In reaching its decision, the Court did not entertain a suggestion by the
State of Illinois and the amicus filers that the Court recognize a new
ground for the constitutional apportionment of intangibles based on the
taxing state's contact with the in-state capital asset (the Lexis business),
rather than its contact with the out-of-state taxpayer (Mead). 22 The
Court also observed that the case's issue and outcome may impact the
law of other jurisdictions such as Ohio and New York, which have both
adopted such a new ground for constitutional apportionment (focusing on
an operational function served by an in-state entity).2 3
Although the unitary issue is increasingly important to Texas franchise
tax, all the reported Texas cases from the Survey period address the
"old," pre-combined-reporting franchise tax. Of course, the holdings of
many "old" franchise tax cases will remain important in the context of the
"new" revised margin tax.24 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs,
for example, addressed apportionment.2 5 The Austin Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision to find TGS liable for franchise taxes
from 1997 to 2003, but waived penalty and interest.2 6 TGS licensed geo-
physical and seismic data used by oil and gas companies to develop oil
and gas deposits.2 7 TGS charged its customers a flat fee for a non-exclu-
sive license to use this data. The appeal concerned a dispute about the
apportionment of TGS's gross receipts from business done in Texas under
sections 171.103 and 171.1032 of the Texas Tax Code.2 8 The crux of
TGS's argument was that TGS is taxed differently than computer
software companies. However, the court of appeals upheld liability be-
cause TGS provided no proof that it was taxed differently than other geo-
physical data companies. 29 TGS also argued that by using TGS's
customers' shipping or billing addresses to determine the location of use,
the comptroller unfairly apportioned a larger share of TGS's gross re-
ceipts to Texas and thereby subjected TGS to higher franchise taxes in
violation of the Commerce Clause. However, the court of appeals deter-
mined that this method was reasonable. 30
Mead had in fact treated Lexis as a unitary business on its Illinois tax returns for the years
1988 through 1994 at the state's insistence to avoid litigation. Id.
21. Id. at 1526.
22. Id. at 1508.
23. Id. at 1509.
24. Because the franchise tax as currently in effect applies to a taxable entity's "taxa-
ble margin," as defined for purposes of chapter 171 of the Texas Tax Code, the tax is often
referred to as the "margin tax." However, as a technical matter, the tax is still the
franchise tax, albeit in a very different form from the franchise tax in effect prior to 2008.
25. 268 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. filed).
26. Id. at 652.
27. Id. at 640.
28. Id. at 645 (focusing on apportionment of receipts from licenses or licensing activi-
ties, as provided for by § 171.103 as amended in 1997).
29. Id. at 648.
30. Id. at 650.
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TGS-NOPEC is also noteworthy for its discussion of penalty criteria.
In determining whether the trial court was correct in finding that the
comptroller abused her discretion by refusing to waive penalty and inter-
est, the court of appeals found that the comptroller incorrectly asserted
that she was required to consider only the six non-audit factors in Comp-
troller Rule 3.5(b) instead of the nine audit factors in Rule 3.5(c). 31 The
record reflected that TGS had relied on letter rulings from the comptrol-
ler to apportion licensing receipts during the time the statute was being
amended, and the court of appeals determined that the agency must fol-
low its own rules and procedure, and affirmed the trial court's award of a
refund of the penalty and interest. 32
Telecommunications companies' franchise taxes have triggered numer-
ous disputes in recent years, involving issues that are sometimes quite
industry specific. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Combs is notewor-
thy because of the telecommunications issues it addresses and because of
its broader implications for, and discussion of, apportionment issues. 33 In
this case, the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding
that Southwestern Bell Telephone (Bell) was liable for franchise taxes
and interest paid under protest, despite Bell's arguments that charges for
customer access to its local telephone network to complete long distance
calls and pay-per-use services, such as operator assistance, should be ex-
cluded from Texas receipts as "receipts from interstate calls" or "reve-
nues from calls in interstate commerce."' 34 The court of appeals had to
determine whether Bell's access and operator assistance charges were
"services performed in this state," in accordance with Texas Tax Code
sections 171.103 and 171.1032.35 Regarding telephone companies, the
comptroller interpreted the phrase "business within this state" to include
fixed periodic access and equipment charges for equipment located in
Texas, whether used for intrastate or interstate communications," and
had, according to the court, consistently interpreted access charges for
the use of telephone networks and facilities to be charges for rendering a
"service. '36 The court of appeals accordingly found that the term "ser-
vice" included the charges at issue. Because the record established that
the services were requested by Bell's customers located in Texas, who
were serviced by Bell's networks, facilities, or personnel located in Texas,
the court concluded that these transactions began and ended in Texas. 37
As such, the court determined that the comptroller was correct in appor-
31. Id. at 652.
32. Id.
33. 270 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. filed).
34. Id. at 272.
35. Id. at 262. The court of appeals initially addressed whether the term "service"
includes providing a customer access to a communications network for the purpose of com-
pleting long distance calls or operator assistance. Id. at 260.
36. Id. at 261.
37. Id. at 262.
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tioning the charges as "gross receipts from business done in Texas." 38
The Survey period produced surprisingly few franchise tax administra-
tive hearings. As with the court cases, some decisions are so specific to
the "old" franchise tax that they may have limited impact on future re-
porting and cases; others, however, foreshadow the emphasis that future
disputes may place on federal tax laws and on other states' interpreta-
tions. Hearing No. 49,034, for example, addressed a taxpayer's efforts to
justify a child-care credit under section 171.703 of the Tax Code by reli-
ance in part on analogous federal income tax interpretations and on a
New Mexico case.39 The decision, in another foreshadowing of future
decisions, considered both legislative intent and the degree to which the
cited authority from other jurisdictions should have any impact on the
Texas case. The administrative law judge, noting significant differences
between the Texas language and the cited provisions, ruled that the tax-
payer was not entitled to the requested credit.40
B. COMPTROLLER RULES
Revisions to the Texas franchise tax in the last two legislative sessions
triggered numerous issues-and multiple new rules-relating not only to
old issues (e.g., how to apportion receipts for franchise tax purposes) but
also to new issues (e.g., how to file a combined group report). The dia-
logue between comptroller staff and taxpayers was, in many respects, a
dance to music provided by the legislature in which all of the parties (and
the band) worked to determine how to move forward under a very differ-
ent taxing regime.
In addition to helpful webinars, website FAQs, and other public com-
ments that provided taxpayers with informal notice of the comptroller's
position on various franchise tax questions, the comptroller also issued a
series of new rules. First officially proposed in the September 14, 2007
issue of the Texas Register, a new set of franchise tax rules to implement
the revised franchise tax was adopted on December 27, 2007, effective
January 1, 2008.41 On November 7, 2008 (one week after the end of the
Survey period), proposed rule amendments appeared in the Texas Regis-
38. Id. at 278. The court of appeals found that the exemption from apportionment for
revenues from calls in interstate commerce did not apply. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 3.549(e)(43) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Taxable Capital: Apportionment),
3.557(e)(39) (2009) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Earned Surplus: Apportionment). The
court also found that Bell failed to establish that the comptroller made an arbitrary and
unreasonable distinction in its treatment of Bell compared to other companies that provide
long distance service but whose receipts from intrastate "legs" of interstate telephone ser-
vice are not apportioned as Texas receipts (i.e. inter-exchange carriers); therefore, Bell's
equal protection claim failed. Bell, 270 S.W.3d at 273.
39. See Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Hearing No. 4,035 (July 1, 2008).
40. Id. (distinguishing Intel Corp. v. State, 931 P.2d 775 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) and
I.R.C. § 129 analyses). Taxpayers should hope that the record of taxpayer losses on
franchise tax hearings during the Survey period does not foreshadow a continuing trend.
41. 32 Tex. Reg. 6271, adopted 32 Tex. Reg. 10013 (2007) (to be codified as amend-
ments to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.581-.595 (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts)).
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ter.4 2 The proposed amendments, regarding rules for passive entities and
cost of goods sold, were not adopted because the comptroller is still con-
sidering the comments received. Although a summary of all the rules is
beyond the scope of this article, it is worthwhile to note some key issues.
1. Passive Entities
Because passive entities are not subject to the franchise tax, the tests
for determining whether an entity is passive are critical. 43 Not surpris-
ingly, Rule 3.582, regarding passive entities, has generated much discus-
sion and controversy. 44
One of the key disputes focuses on whether it is appropriate for the
comptroller to refer, as she does in subsection (c) of the rule, to an en-
tity's net capital gains and net gains in the context of determining whether
an entity's income is at least 90 percent passive, and therefore, whether
the entity qualifies as a passive entity.45 Commentators have pointed out
that the statutory language never uses the word "net" in this context. 46 In
electing to retain the original language from the proposed rule, the comp-
troller's position is, in part, that the statute bases the passive entity deter-
mination on an entity's federal gross income, and that federal gross
income includes these net items.47 However, the comptroller's interpre-
tation may not adequately take into account the federal tax landscape,
including the federal taxation of gains on sales of certain depreciable and
real property under Internal Revenue Code section 1231, which in some
circumstances requires a reclassification of certain gains and losses that
could affect this passive entity calculation.48
Similarly, the comptroller has added gloss to the passive entity criteria
by adopting a definition of "security" for purposes of defining passive
sources of income that appears to depart from the statutory language and
intent.49 Specifically, Rule 3.582 provides that income from certain secur-
ity and ownership interests will be considered passive only if the owner
has a non-controlling interest in the investee.50 Commentators suggested
in late 2007 that the comptroller delete the "non-controlling" criterion
from the rule, but as with the "net" gain interpretation, the comptroller
declined to modify the rule, maintaining that a controlling interest in any
entity is, by definition, not passive.51 The comptroller also rejected sug-
42. Eight of the amendments received no comments and were published on December
26, 2008, effective January 1, 2009. See 33 Tex. Reg. 9055, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 10502
(2008) (to be codified as amendments to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.584).
43. See generally TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0003 (Vernon 2008).
44. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582 (2009).
45. Id.; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0003(a)(2) (Vernon 2008).
46. 32 Tex. Reg. 10015 (2007) (to be codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582).
47. Id.
48. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
49. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582 (2009).
50. Id.
51. 32 Tex. Reg. 6271, adopted 32 Tex. Reg. 10013 (2007) (to be codified as amend-
ments to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582).
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gestions that "security" be defined in this context as it is defined in the
Securities Act, maintaining that the Act is merely regulatory in nature
and not an apt reference point. 52
Though amendments proposed in 2008 to the passive entity rule have
not yet been adopted, some troublesome proposed changes merit atten-
tion. For example, a proposed change to the rule is designed to
recharacterize distributive shares of partnership income (which are pas-
sive) as rental income to the partner (which is not passive) if the underly-
ing partnership revenue is rental income. 53 In essence, the comptroller is
proposing-without statutory language to support her position-to
recharacterize passive partnership distributive income as active income if
the underlying source of the distribution is rental income.54 This inter-
pretation stands in stark contrast to the statute, which clearly provides
that partnership distributive income is passive.55 If the comptroller were
to adopt this interpretation, taxpayers would surely challenge it as an un-
warranted reinterpretation of the statutory language.
2. Nexus
The comptroller's laundry list of activities that create nexus with Texas
for franchise tax purposes, set forth in Rule 3.586, generally tracks the
nexus examples set forth in the old Rule 3.546, relating to nexus for taxa-
ble capital purposes. 56 The comptroller has explained that the list is sim-
ply a clarification and combination of current rules, and does not
represent a change in policy.57 However, some practitioners have been
scratching their heads over certain provisions that they perceive as
changes from old policy.
Oil and gas industry representatives, for instance, requested that the
comptroller amend subsections (c)(4), (c)(9), and (c)(17) to exclude from
the list of activities that give an entity nexus with Texas the newly-formu-
lated descriptions of delivering into Texas materials that remain in inter-
state commerce even as they rest here-apparently intended to include
gas that passes through Texas in interstate pipelines.5 8 The comptroller
declined to make the requested change, citing the legislature's long-
standing requirement that the franchise tax be imposed to the full extent
of the U.S. Constitution. 59 Note, however, that at least one Texas court
52. Id.
53. 33 Tex. Reg. 9053 (2008) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.582). See in particular subsection (d)(1), which excludes from passive characteri-
zation "rent, including rental income that flows from a partnership to a partner."
54. Id.
55. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0003(a)(2)(B) (Vernon 2008).
56. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.586 (2009). Immediately prior to 2008, the franchise tax
required taxpayers to calculate their tax liability by reference to taxable capital and earned
surplus.






has held that when an entity's sole connection with the state is ownership
of property temporarily stored here, but always in interstate commerce,
the U.S. Constitution does not give the entity sufficient nexus with Texas
to subject it to taxation in Texas. 60
Practitioners have also noted with curiosity the comptroller's addition
of "collecting accounts" and "repossessing property," in connection with
loan production activities, to the laundry list of nexus-creating activities,
though the comptroller has responded that these new items do not re-
present changes in policy. 61
Any student of the comptroller's nexus policy will note without sur-
prise the rule's proclamation that Public Law 86-272 does not apply to the
franchise tax.62 This is due to the fact that Public Law 86-272, which pro-
hibits states from taxing income derived from purely interstate activity,
applies only to net income taxes and, as the comptroller is fond of recit-
ing, the franchise tax is not a net income tax.63 Of course, that asser-
tion-with respect to the franchise tax both as revised and as it existed
prior to January 1, 2008-has long been, and will continue to be, the sub-
ject of debate.
3. Reports
The comptroller amended Rule 3.584, regarding reports and payments,
to tie reporting periods more closely to the statutory ceilings and to clar-
ify the reporting requirements of nontaxable entities. 64 In addition, a sec-
tion was added regarding the calculation of annualized total revenue.
Taxable entities that have an accounting period that is more or less than
twelve months must annualize total revenue to determine eligibility for
the $300,000 no tax due threshold, tax discounts, and the E-Z Computa-
tion. 65 The one-half percent rate of taxable margin for entities engaged
primarily in retail or wholesale trade is still applicable.
4. Cost of Goods Sold-Beginning Inventory
The debates and discussions of how to compute costs of goods sold are
extensive enough to justify an entire article-or multiple articles. In
some cases, judicial or legislative interpretation will be required. In at
least one situation, though, the comptroller and taxpayers ultimately
60. See Peoples Gas, Light, & Coke Co. v. Harrison Cent. Appraisal Dist., 270 S.W.3d
208 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. filed).
61. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.586(c)(11) (2009).
62. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.586(e) (referring to 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (2006); 32 Tex. Reg. 6282 (2007) (to be codified as an amend-
ment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.586).
64. 33 Tex. Reg. 9056, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 10502 (2008) (to be codified as 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.584). Language was added to require that a nontaxable entity reply to
the Comptroller within thirty days when asked in writing if the entity is taxable and lan-
guage regarding privilege periods was removed because privilege periods no longer affect
the calculation of the franchise tax. Id.
65. Id. The E-Z Computation is described more concisely to emphasize that a deduc-
tion for cost of goods sold or compensation is not allowed when using this method. Id.
1470 [Vol. 62
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agreed on a revision to the comptroller's original interpretation. Rule
3.588, as originally adopted, provided that no deduction was available for
beginning inventory in computing cost of goods sold.66 However, multi-
ple comments to the comptroller staff ultimately persuaded them that de-
nying a deduction for beginning inventory is inconsistent with statutory
intent-and would result in significantly overstating revenue for many
taxpayers.67 Accordingly, proposed amendments to Rule 3.588 include
adding language to clarify that an election must be made to capitalize or
expense allowable costs for the cost of goods sold and allowing a begin-
ning inventory only to taxable entities that elect to capitalize costs. 68 An-
other proposed revision would provide that only expenses that are
excluded from total revenue may not be included in the determination of
cost of goods sold.69
5. Compensation Deduction
In many respects, the compensation deduction is less complex than the
cost of goods sold deduction. The rule regarding compensation deduc-
tions was amended to clarify, for example, that the $300,000 per person
limit on wages and cash compensation is measured per the twelve-month
period on which the tax is based. 70 In addition, subsections regarding
staff leasing companies were reworded to clarify that the specified pay-
ments cannot be included as compensation, and that a staff leasing com-




During the Survey period, a number of cases addressed jurisdictional
issues in the property tax context. In addition, several non-procedural
cases focused on interesting and developing areas of Texas property tax
law, including the taxability of aircraft. One non-procedural case of note
during the review period, Peoples Gas, Light, & Coke Co. v. Harrison
Central Appraisal District, considered whether natural gas temporarily
stored in Texas on its way out of the state should be subject to property
66. See 32 Tex. Reg. 6288, adopted 32 Tex. Reg. 10036 (2007) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.588).
67. Id.; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012 (Vernon 2008).
68. See 33 Tex. Reg. 9061 (2008) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.588). In addition, a new paragraph was added to clarify how a taxable entity
elects to deduct the cost of goods sold to determine margin and what restrictions apply
when making that election.
69. See id. Language was deleted that did not allow costs related to excluded revenue
to be included in the determination of the cost of goods sold. In addition, language was
proposed to include bars in the list of entities described as "Eating and Drinking Places,"
and to allow beverages to be included, like food, as part of the cost of goods sold relating
to acquisition and production activities for restaurants and bars. Id.
70. 33 Tex. Reg. 9063, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 10504 (2008) (to be codified as an amend-




tax in Texas.72 Peoples, the taxpayer in this case, purchased gas from
suppliers and delivered it outside of the state.73 The.gas at issue was
stored underground in large, depleted natural gas fields.74 For several
years, Peoples had prevailed in challenges to the taxability of the gas, and
the appraisal district had agreed to remove the gas from its rolls on the
advice of its appraisal consultant firm.75 After several years of removing
the gas from its rolls, the district heeded the advice of a new appraisal
consultant firm and refused to remove the gas, giving rise to this
litigation.76
The trial court ruled that the district had the right to assess property tax
on the gas and the taxpayer appealed. 77 The Texarkana Court of Appeals
opinion laid out an analytical framework in agreeing with the taxpayer
and reversing the trial court opinion. 78
First, the court considered whether Peoples could be considered the
owner of the gas. 79 In determining that Peoples did in fact own the gas,
the court looked to the extensive regulatory framework governing gas
storage and transportation contracts, which barred the pipeline operator
from taking ownership of the gas. 80 The court noted that the pipeline
operator and Peoples, which had purchased the gas, were the only two
entities in the chain of the gas's movement. The court concluded that,
because the pipeline operator could not be the owner, Peoples was neces-
sarily the owner.81
Having determined that Peoples owned the gas, the court next consid-
ered whether the Commerce Clause shields the gas from property tax.82
The court determined, in relatively short order, that the gas was in inter-
state commerce, having been "placed with a common carrier," that is, the
pipeline operator.83 The court noted that Peoples had no contractual
right to control the direction or time of the gas's movement, so the inter-
state nature of the pipeline controlled this analysis.84 The court next con-
sidered whether the gas's temporary storage in the depleted underground
field removed it from interstate commerce. 85 Citing Independent Ware-
houses, Inc. v. Scheele,86 the court noted that "[t]he crucial question in
determining whether the state may exert its taxing power is whether there
72. Peoples Gas, Light, & Coke Co. v. Harrison Cent. Appraisal Dist., 270 S.W.3d 208
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. filed).




77. Id. at 212.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 212-14.
80. Id. at 213-14.
81. Id. at 212-14.
82. Id. at 214.
83. Id. at 215.
84. Id. at 216.
85. Id. at 215-18.
86. 331 U.S. 70, 73 (1947).
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is 'continuity of transit,"' and further noted that "interstate movement...
may be regarded as continuing.., despite temporary interruptions due to
the necessities of the journey. '87 Looking again to the fact that Peoples
did not control the movement of the gas, the court determined that its
storage in Texas was incident to its interstate movement, that the inter-
state movement had been continuous, and that Peoples's interest in the
property could not, consistent with the Commerce Clause, be subjected
to property tax in Texas.88
In one of several aircraft property tax cases during the Survey period,
the Dallas Court of Appeals considered a taxpayer's argument that its
aircraft was not used "continually" within Texas, and therefore, should
not be subject to property tax in Texas. 89 The Alaska Flight Services air-
craft was operated and based during the tax year outside of Texas.90 Of
the aircraft's forty-plus departures during the tax year, less than a quarter
were from Texas. 91 The taxpayer argued that Texas Tax Code section
11.01(c)(3), which provides that "[the] state has jurisdiction to tax tangi-
ble personal property if the property is . . . used continually, whether
regularly or irregularly, in [the] state,"92 did not reach its aircraft because
of the relatively low number of departures from within Texas. 93
The court rejected the taxpayer's proposal that the court construe
"continually" to mean "used in Texas without interruption, i.e., not used
outside of Texas at all, no matter how much the property is used in
Texas."' 94 Rather, the court held that "property is 'used continually,
whether regularly or irregularly, in this state' if the property is used while
it is present in this state, during the tax year," and provided further that
such "use can be regular or irregular in pattern or amount, so long as the
property is used over the course of the tax year."' 95 Therefore, the court
held that the taxpayer's aircraft was taxable. 96
The aircraft owner in C.I. T. Leasing Corp. v. Dallas Central Appraisal
District97 fared better than the taxpayer in Alaska Flight Services. In that
case, C.I.T. Leasing "erroneously rendered" its aircraft for taxation and
"the appraisal district assessed property tax on the aircraft. ' 98 After at-
tempting unsuccessfully to resolve the issue with the appraisal district, the
taxpayer paid the taxes under protest, several months late, and filed a
87. Peoples, 270 S.W.3d at 215-16.
88. Id. at 219.
89. Ala. Flight Servs., LLC v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 261 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
90. Id. at 885.
91. Id.
92. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.01(c)(3) (Vernon 2008).
93. Ala. Flight, 261 S.W.3d at 889-90.
94. Id. at 888.
95. Id. at 889.
96. Id. at 890.
97. No. 05-06-01546-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9701 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 13,
2007, no pet.).
98. Id. at *1.
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motion with the appraisal review board to correct the tax roll.99 The
board dismissed the motion without considering the merits because the
taxpayer had failed to pay its property taxes timely. 00
When the taxpayer sued to have the tax roll corrected pursuant to sec-
tion 25.25 of the Texas Tax Code, 10' the district court maintained that the
taxpayer had failed to comply with Tax Code section 42.08 because it had
not timely paid property tax on the aircraft. 10 2 As the court noted,
[s]ection 42.08 requires a property owner to pay, before the delin-
quency date, the lesser of (1) the amount of taxes due on the portion
of the taxable value of the property that is not in dispute or (2) the
amount of taxes due on the property under the order from which the
appeal is taken.10 3
Because the taxpayer was disputing the entire amount of taxes, and had
clearly indicated so at the hearing and in its petition, the court held that
the taxpayer had complied with Tax Code section 42.08, and reversed and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 10 4
The courts issued several interesting opinions addressing procedural
and jurisdictional issues in the property tax context during the Survey
period as well. In Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal
District v. O'Connor & Assocs. and Appraisal Review Board of Harris
County Appraisal District v. Spencer Square Ltd., the Fourteenth District
Court of Appeals at Houston considered cases in which taxpayers
claimed that district courts' writs of mandamus were the only avenue by
which the taxpayers could obtain proper appraisal review board
hearings.10 5
In Spencer Square, the taxpayer had protested the appraisal district's
valuation of its property and prevailed, but nevertheless sought a writ of
mandamus almost one year later to order the appraisal review board "to
conduct a new protest hearing. '10 6 Similarly, in O'Connor, the taxpayer
"had either already filed or would likely file protests of the appraised
value of their property," but complained that the appraisal review board
was postponing hearings, refusing to consider property owners' evi-
dence, considering evidence that HCAD had not produced to prop-
erty owners, determining protests in favor of HCAD even when
HCAD presented insufficient or no evidence, and issuing only one
order to resolve claims contesting both the appraised value and une-
99. Id.
100. Id. at *1-2.
101. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c)(1) (Vernon 2008).
102. C.. T. Leasing, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9701, at *2.
103. Id. at *4 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08 (Vernon 2008) (emphasis added)).
104. Id. at *4-5.
105. Appraisal Review Bd. of Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. O'Connor & Assocs.,
267 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Appraisal Review
Bd. of Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Spencer Square Ltd., 252 S.W.3d 842, 843 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
106. Spencer Square, 252 S.W.3d at 843.
1474 [Vol. 62
qual appraisal of the property.1 0 7
In each case, the court held that the taxpayer had not been denied its
right to a hearing on the valuation issue and had failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies. 0 8 The O'Connor opinion acknowledged that
Texas Tax Code section 41.45(f) "states that the district court may compel
the Board to hold a hearing when a property owner has been denied a
hearing to which he is entitled."1 0 9 The court nevertheless rejected the
taxpayers' argument that "the hearing to which a property owner is enti-
tled under section 41.45(f) is one conducted according to the law and end-
ing with a proper order."'1 0 The court noted in its opinion that adopting
the taxpayers' interpretation of Tax Code section 41.45(f) "would allow
property owners to circumvent the appeal provisions in chapter 42 [set-
ting forth the procedure for appealing from an adverse appraisal review
board hearing] and sue in district court simply by alleging the Board
failed to adhere to procedural guidelines," and noted further that
"[i]nterpreting section 41.45(f) as creating another avenue of appeal to
the district court would essentially render the appeal provisions in chap-
ter 42 meaningless." ' In both cases, the court concluded that the tax-
payers were not entitled to writs of mandamus and were required to
exhaust their administrative remedies before again appealing to the dis-
trict courts. 112
The court delivering the opinion in Koll Bren Fund VI, LP v. Harris
County Appraisal District, offered an important reminder to purchasers
of taxable property. 113 In that case, the former owner had sold taxable
property in August of the tax year. 1' 4 In the following year, the seller
filed a notice of protest with the appraisal review board as the owner of
the property, claiming that the assessed value "was excessive.' 1 5 The
appraisal review board reduced the value of the property, but the former
owner nevertheless challenged the board's determination in district court,
again asserting that it was the property owner.1 6 Over fifteen months
later, the seller amended its pleadings to include the purchaser as a plain-
tiff.11 7 The trial court ruled, and the appeals court affirmed, that the
seller did not have standing to challenge the valuation because it did not
own the property on January 1 of the year following the tax year." 8 The
court did note that the purchaser had acquired standing to challenge the
107. O'Connor, 267 S.W.3d at 413-14.
108. Spencer Square, 252 S.W.3d at 845-46; O'Connor, 267 S.W.3d at 419.
109. O'Connor, 267 S.W.3d at 417.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Spencer Square, 252 S.W.3d at 845-46; O'Connor, 267 S.W.3d at 419.
113. Koll Bren Fund VI, LP v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., No. 01-07-00321-CV,
2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1521 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 28, 2008, pet. dism'd).
114. Id. at *4.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *4-5.
117. Id. at *5.
118. Id. at *12.
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property valuation when it acquired the property. 119 Nevertheless, be-
cause the seller brought the challenge, the purchaser had failed to pursue,
on its own behalf, its Tax Code chapter 41 right to protest the value, and
therefore, lacked standing to bring a court challenge. 20
In Covert v. Williamson Central Appraisal District, the taxpayers sued
to challenge what they claimed were unequal valuations of their property
by the appraisal district. 12' The appraisal district opposed their suit on
the grounds that the taxpayers had not stated a claim because they had
asserted that only the land portion of their property-and not the entire
property-was unequally valued.' 22 The court looked to Tax Code sec-
tion 42.26, which provides that "[t]he district court shall grant relief on
the ground that a property is appraised unequally if the appraised value
of the property exceeds the median appraised value of a reasonable num-
ber of comparable properties appropriately adjusted. ' ' 123 The taxpayers
urged the court to parse the statute, arguing that because the legislature
had opted to use the general article "a" before the first appearance of
"property" and the more specific article "the" before the second appear-
ance, its clear intent had been to "narrow the median test 'to whichever
matter or thing was selected for challenge by the property owner."124
The court rejected this reading, preferring to consider the plain meaning
of the statute, and concluded that "a taxpayer challenging the equal and
uniform assessment of an improved property under Tax Code section
42.26 must allege that the overall appraised value of the property is une-
qual."'21 5 The court did concede, however, that "evidence that only the
land or only the improvements were assessed unequally is certainly rele-
vant to [a] taxpayer's challenge."'1 26
Finally, in a couple of cases from the be-careful-what-you-wish-for file,
taxpayers who were challenging their property valuations in appraisal re-
view board hearings found themselves in surprise agreement with the ap-
praisal districts whose valuations they were challenging. In Mann v.
Harris County Appraisal District and Verm v. Harris County Appraisal
District, the taxpayers challenged in appraisal review board hearings what
they claimed were excessive valuations of their property and proposed
lower values. 127 Not to be outdone, the district representative in Mann
followed the taxpayer representative by proposing an even lower value,
but quickly corrected himself, and agreed with the taxpayer's proposed
119. Id. at *13.
120. Id. at *13-14.
121. Covert v. Williamson Cent. Appraisal Dist., 241 S.W.3d 655,656 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 2007, pet. denied).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 658 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.26(d) (Vernon 2001)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 661.
126. Id. at 659.
127. Verm v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., No. 14-06-01046-CV, 2008 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4900, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2008, no pet.); Mann v. Harris
County Appraisal Dist., No. 01-07-00436-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2790, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 17, 2008, no pet.).
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value. 128 The district representatives in Verm similarly agreed with his
taxpayer opponent as to the appropriate value. 129 Neither taxpayer pro-
tested further in the hearings, and in both cases, the appraisal review
board ordered the district to lower the property values according to the
apparently agreed-upon values. 130
Both taxpayers later brought suit in district court appealing the order
to the district to lower their property values to the amounts mentioned in
their hearings. 31 In both cases, the taxpayers claimed that there had
been no agreement between themselves and the district because they had
not "announced" or otherwise formalized an agreement. 132 Both taxpay-
ers also complained that dismissing their suits would deprive them of
their due process rights to challenge the valuation of their properties. 133
In both cases, the courts held that the taxpayers had availed themselves
of an opportunity to be heard and, as the courts noted, had obtained pre-
cisely the results they sought, therefore suffering no due process depriva-
tion. The courts both further held that the taxpayers could not
appropriately appeal from the review board's decisions because "an
agreement between a property owner.., and the chief appraiser is final if
the agreement relates to a matter . . . which may be protested to the
appraisal review board [or a matter] on which a protest has been filed but
not determined by the board.1 34 Because the parties had reached an
"agreement" prior to issuance of the review board orders, and because
the agreements were deemed final when made, the review board orders
were not "determinations" of the taxpayers' protests, and the agreements
were therefore final and not appealable.1 35
IV. PROCEDURE
A. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
In a scenario that may become more common during the current eco-
nomic downturn, the State pursued individuals for a corporation's unpaid
sales taxes. In State v. Crawford, the State sued Steve Crawford and Rob-
ert Wills as responsible individuals for the sales tax liability of S.L. Craw-
ford Construction, Inc. because the individuals were officers of the
128. Mann, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2790, at *4.
129. Verm, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4900, at *2.
130. Verm, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4900, at *2; Mann, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2790, at
*4.
131. Verm, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4900, at *2; Mann, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2790, at
*4.
132. Verm, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4900, at *7; Mann, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2790, at
*10-11.
133. Verm, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4900, at *7-8; Mann, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2790, at
*15-16.
134. Verm, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4900, at *4-7 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 1.111(3)(1) (Vernon 2008)); Mann, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2790, at *10-15 (citing TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 1.111(e)).




company, signed the sales tax returns, and had the authority to sign com-
pany checks. 136 The case centered on whether the defendants acted will-
fully in failing to pay the delinquent sales tax amounts.137 The company
collected but did not remit sales tax on certain construction jobs because
the bookkeeper incorrectly marked the job as nontaxable in the com-
pany's monthly sales tax worksheets. 138 After an audit, the company re-
quested a redetermination hearing but subsequently withdrew its
petition, resulting in the tax becoming due and payable within twenty
days. 139 The comptroller sent the final notice of its order to the wrong
address, so the company was not aware of the final determination until
the comptroller had frozen the company's bank accounts, an action that
ultimately contributed to the company's failure. 140
In addressing the meaning of the term "willfully," the district court
ruled that the term "willfully" requires a higher mental state than reckless
disregard and that the State had failed to meet the burden of proof.141
The Austin Court of Appeals found that the term "willfully" in Tax Code
section 111.016(b) encompasses both knowledge and reckless disregard
and that the evidence established that the defendants did not act with
either knowledge or reckless disregard. Thus, the appellate court af-
firmed the district court holding.142 The court of appeals agreed with the
district court that the legislature intended to adopt the federal court's
construction of the term "willfully to include both actual knowledge and
reckless disregard."'143 Regarding the burden of proof issue, the court
determined that regardless of whether the State introduces a certificate of
the comptroller showing the tax delinquency, the State retains the burden
of proof on the issue of willfulness under Tax Code section 111.016(b). 144
Finally, the court determined that there must be a "known or obvious
risk" that tax "is owed but not paid" in order to satisfy the reckless disre-
gard prong of the "willfully" standard and the evidence did not establish
the defendants met this prong.145
136. State v. Crawford, 262 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
137. Id. at 537.
138. Id. at 535.
139. Id. at 536.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 537.
142. Id. at 534. Not only was the evidence sufficient to support the district court's find-
ing that the defendants had no knowledge that the tax was actually collected, but there was
sufficient evidence that the defendants "did not have knowledge that the tax delinquency"
on the job in question had become due. Id. at 546. Furthermore, the State presented no
evidence that the company paid "unencumbered funds" to other creditors after the point
at which the defendants had knowledge of the final determination of the tax due. Id. at
546-47.
143. Id. at 538. The defendants introduced Texas case law defining the term "willfully"
in other contexts to argue that the term lies on a continuum. Id. at 541. However, the
appellate court determined that such continuum placing "willful" between "knowing" and
"intentional" does not apply beyond claims related to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act or
the imposition of mental anguish damages. Id. at 541.
144. Id. at 544.
145. Id. at 548.
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In State v. Essentially Yours Industries, Inc., the Austin Court of Ap-
peals affirmed a take-nothing judgment in favor of Essentially Yours In-
dustries, Inc. (EYI, Inc.) in a suit by the State of Texas and approximately
170 governmental entities "to recover allegedly delinquent state and local
sales taxes."'1 46 EYI, Inc., "a network marketing business similar in struc-
ture to Amway," was a shell corporation with no sales activity in Texas.
However, its parent, Essentially Yours Industries, Corp. (EYI, Corp.),
made sales to Texas customers through distributors located in Texas.'
47
The comptroller's auditor assessed EYI, Inc., but the officer who pre-
pared the responses had provided information regarding EYI, Corp. in-
stead of EYI, Inc.1
48
The State filed suit to recover the audit deficiency, and following a
bench trial, the court entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of EYI,
Inc.14 9 The State appealed, arguing "that the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient" to support the finding "that EYI, Inc. was not the
same taxpayer that had been audited.' 150 The Austin Court of Appeals
reviewed only the issue of whether EYI, Inc. was indeed the correct tax-
payer.1 51 Because, the State had the burden of proof at trial, the court
again placed the burden on the State to show that either the evidence
conclusively established as a matter of law that EYI, Inc. was the correct
taxpayer or, in the alternative, that the finding of the court was so against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it was clearly
wrong and unjust. 15 2 The court of appeals determined that there was suf-
ficient evidence to support the district court's finding that EYI, Corp., not
EYI, Inc., was the taxpayer audited. 5 3 Furthermore, in response to the
state's estoppel argument that EYI, Inc. knowingly misrepresented itself
and intended the comptroller to believe it was the taxpayer, the court
determined that the evidence revealed both sides were confused as to
which entity was being audited and that neither party noticed the discrep-
ancy while the audit was being conducted.
154
In Guardian Life Insurance Co. v. Kinder, Inc., the district court denied
the plaintiff's motion to dismiss and default judgment filed against
Kinder.155 In this case, the Texas Secretary of State issued a corporate
146. State v. Essentially Yours Indus., Inc., No. 03-07-00506-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS
6466, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 28, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id. at *34.
150. Id. at *4.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *6.
153. Id. Evidence included: (1) listing EYI, Corp.'s taxpayer identification number, (2)
referring to taxpayer as EYI, Corp. in audit questionnaires, (3) franchise tax returns filed
in the name of EYI, Corp., (4) letters and faxes sent to auditor on behalf of EYI, Corp., (5)
the auditor designated the taxpayer as EYI, Corp. in the audit plan she prepared, and (6)
the electronic funds transfer to the comptroller listed EYI, Corp. Id. at *6-7.
154. Id. at *11.
155. No. H-06-1745, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6506, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2008).
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charter forfeiture when Kinder failed to pay franchise taxes.156 The dis-
trict court determined that when a corporation forfeits its charter for fail-
ure to pay franchise taxes, the Texas Business Corporations Act (the Act)
controls, and the corporation continues its existence because the Act was
amended to include in the definition of "dissolved corporation" as those
corporations "whose charter was forfeited pursuant to the Tax code."'1 57
For three years after a charter is forfeited, the Act provides that the cor-
poration has a right to both sue and defend itself.158 Therefore, the Dis-
trict Court denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss because Kinder was
included as a defendant within the three-year period and, as such, was
entitled to defend itself and bring counterclaims in court.
In Wilson v. State, a similar procedural case, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals addressed whether, in the case of delinquent franchise taxes, an in-
dividual must be personally assessed by the State.159 The State failed to
personally assess and file suit against Thomas Wilson, the sole officer and
director of Wilson Nursery, Inc. (the Nursery), which "twice had its cor-
porate privileges forfeited for failing to timely file its franchise tax re-
ports.' 160 The court of appeals determined that "there is no authority
requiring the personal assessment of a director or officer before filing suit
... for taxes that have been assessed against the corporation.' 161 Wilson
also argued that the suit was not timely because it was filed more than
three years after the delinquency became due and payable. 162 However,
the court of appeals held that the statute tolled during the time the ad-
ministrative redetermination process was requested by the Nursery and
the "tolling [was] expressly restricted by issues, not by [the] parties."'163
Therefore, tolling applies if an issue contested in the corporation's admin-
istration redetermination "[was] also an issue as to the director or of-
ficer's personal tax liability."'1 64 The district court's holding was affirmed,
granting summary judgment in favor of the State.165
156. Id. at *2.
157. Id. at *4-5. The Texas Business Corporations Act was amended in 1993 to make it
consistent with section 171.252 of the Texas Tax Code, which states that once the corporate
privileges are forfeited, "the corporation shall be denied the right to sue or defend in a
court of this state." Id. at *4.
158. Id. at *5; TEX. Bus. CORP. Act ANN., art. 7.12(A) (Vernon 2003).
159. Wilson v. State, 272 S.W.3d 686, 687 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
160. Id. at 689.
161. Id.; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255 (Vernon 2008).
162. Wilson, 272 S.W.3d at 689.
163. Id. at 689-90.
164. Id. at 690. The court of appeals determined that the "State's suit against Wilson
individually for corporate sales tax liability under tax code section 171.255 violated neither
tax code section 111.201's four-year period during which a tax that has become due and
payable may be assessed, nor tax code section 111.202's three-year period during which




The transfer of contested cases to SOAH resulted in fewer cases mov-
ing to hearings, at least during the early months of the Survey period.
The comptroller also worked to reduce the backlog of older cases, includ-
ing actively pursuing settlements in some cases. As more cases move for-
ward to SOAH hearings, both taxpayers and the comptroller's hearings
attorneys are finding that the SOAH hearings, while very similar in some
procedural aspects and held before several of the administrative law
judges who were formerly employed by the comptroller, appear to have a
more formal emphasis on ensuring that both parties have verified that
their evidence is in the record. That difference, together with others re-
garding the time that pleadings are deemed filed, merits paying careful
attention to not only the comptroller's procedural rules but also to the
SOAH rules.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Survey period ended, legislators were preparing for the 2009
regular session. In addition to the hundreds of anticipated property tax
bills expected to be filed, legislators will undoubtedly be asked to review
the franchise tax. Many small businesses, as well as some very large ones,
are pushing for relief from a franchise tax that they view as dispropor-
tionately high. Other interested parties and legislators are interested in
clean-up changes to the way in which the tax is calculated. On the other
hand, given the fact that the tax produced less revenue than was expected
during its first year, that the comptroller has indicated that she will not
propose any franchise tax legislation during the 2009 session, and that the
economy has been spiraling downward, it is unlikely that Texas will see
major franchise tax legislative changes in 2009. As for any important
changes to the franchise tax, the sales tax, or the property tax, those will
be a good starting place for next year's Survey article.
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